

Dollree Mapp, etc.,    )  
    )  
Appellant,    )  
    )      On Appeal from the Supreme  
v.    )      Court of Ohio.  
    )  
Ohio.    )

[April , 1961.]

MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant stands convicted of knowingly having in

her possession certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and  
photographs in violation of § 2905.34 of Ohio's Revised Code.

The Supreme Court of Ohio *As officially stated* in a syllabus to its opinion has found

that her conviction was valid even though "based primarily upon

the introduction in evidence of lewd and lascivious books and

pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's

home . . . ." 170 Ohio Stat. 427. The State says that even

though under our cases the search violated the Fourth Amendment,

it is not prevented from using the seized evidence at trial, citing

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). This Court did so hold under

the circumstances existing at that time. However, on this appeal wherein

Cooperative

Gas w/ water

Hunting  
Ken  
Elkins  
Rios  
Wilson

Val of work  
Gundorff

Standby

Utility  
as one

John  
Lewis  
Jones

Sabby

Weller

Drake

Brentwood  
Polar

DP.

Dine

Brentwood

Polar

In the 1st years between Wolf and Jarman  
since  
the Court<sup>has</sup> dealt with faults of the Four<sup>21</sup>  
Amendment problem in some ~~to~~ cases of crimes.  
In ~~only~~ one of more cases was the (where we)  
required to deal with a state rule tolerating  
admission of illegally seized evidence. The rule  
considering it <sup>not in the doctrine of Wolf,</sup> was as a "rule of evidence" in fashioning which  
the state had wide discretion. The Court was  
made to find ~~in~~ a <sup>not yet</sup> denial of equal  
protection of the laws merely because the rule  
did not operate in all types of criminal  
prosecutions. Salsburg v. Maryland 346 U.S.  
545. In another we held that ~~evidence~~ a  
~~suspicious~~ conviction obtained by use of evidence  
seized in a manner so shocking as to be  
"incredible were it not admitted" offended  
basic notions of decency. Rodin v. California  
(ignoring for those purposes of that case the  
Fourth Amendment and the rule of Wolf.  
whereby the state had <sup>not yet</sup> chosen <sup>not to</sup> follow.

In the years since Wolf was decided a score of opinions have been handed down by this Court dealing with search and seizure made in violation of the constitutional standards. In large measure they have been concerned with satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment criterion of reasonableness in a particular factual instance. But that by a process not devoid of logic they have gradually but surely made more meaningful the explicit command or ~~its~~<sup>its</sup> transmitted care.

"The remedies of private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police" which led

the Court to find the exclusionary rule not necessary to "minimal

standards assured by the Due Process Clause" have proven to be so

worthless and futile that they are of no earthly use in protecting

the people in their right to privacy; nor do we find that more

protection is secured through the exertion of "local opinion,

sporadically aroused . . . against oppressive conduct on the part

motions were granted. Notably, of the police;" likewise time has proven the "weighty testimony"

These cases were for the most part related to gowly and unattractive defendants who, we may conceive it somewhat

practiced to believe, are unlikely aggressors of an effective body of respectable public opinion.

In some states however, the incidence of unlawful search o f this Court in the past few years have brushed aside many of the grosser offenses in slight.

logical faults of technical exceptions to the exclusionary rule cited in Irvine v.

For, at that time this Court had not seen fit to exclude illegally seized evidence in federal cases unless a federal officer perpetrated

the wrong; but only last year that objection was neutralized by our decision in Sklar v. U.S. 364 U.S.

pointed out in People v. Defore, supra, "There are dangers in

any choice," at p. \_\_\_\_\_, and the enforcement of the exclusionary

rule. Similarly, as of

the same decision, the limits on availability of the remedy of exclusion were negated

constitutional mandate "second to none in the Bill of Rights," Harris <sup>not long after Ex parte Fugate, and</sup> <sup>as a consequence of considering the Wheeler rule merely one</sup> <sup>of evidence in reference of it to affect state judicial</sup> <sup>use of federally unlawfully seized evidence tendered by</sup> <sup>federal agents was effected not through constitutionally</sup> <sup>impaired testaments, but through exercise of a disciplining</sup> <sup>powers. Even that exercise has narrow limits, however,</sup> <sup>and will not be made in every case. Wilson</sup> <sup>Rea v. U.S. 337 U.S. 214.)</sup> <sup>Schnettler 365 U.S. 875</sup>

in ~~whole~~

But the ~~testament~~ <sup>in whole</sup> witness to anyone constitutionally ~~domestic~~ implement  
the rule of Weeks created the formulae. The doctrine that decided  
Rochin v. US was brought down to this Court. Re-evaluation of  
Wolf at that time was considered premature, as we have  
noted above, and was not even suggested by the government <sup>later</sup>  
Brennan <sup>had</sup> prosecutor <sup>had</sup> also wanted to overturn  
Brathwaite v. Abram. If nothing else, Rochin carried out of  
the permissible area described by Wolf. Those instances in  
which discretionary rules of evidence must bow before  
more deeply embedded motions, however inchoate, while  
the Due Process clause presumes, in its assumption of a  
fair trial. But for a long while before Rochin this Court  
embraced the Due Process clause as defining ~~the~~ <sup>as</sup> rights <sup>of</sup> confession  
obtained by coercion, and such confessions were no less violative  
of the Eighth Amendment for the Court. That decided Weeks There  
was disclosure of unlawfully seized evidence in a federal  
court a violation of the Fourth. "The tendency... to obtain  
convictions by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions  
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are  
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to  
which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance  
of such fundamental rights." 232 U.S. at 392. Why a greater degree  
of brutality is prerequisite to barring use of unlawfully seized evidence  
than is necessary for voiding a conviction based on a coerced confession  
is a distinction between trials fair and unfair made necessary only  
because of this Court's <sup>as necessary</sup> ~~history~~ <sup>what had been urged desirable</sup> to acknowledge <sup>for decades</sup>  
~~it~~, in addition to the core <sup>of</sup> the Fourth Amendment,  
By excluding under the XV the only remedy which makes the core  
of the IVB worthwhile. The <sup>as</sup> ~~intended~~ bar on use of out  
of court <sup>as</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>be derived from</sup> <sup>as</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>standard</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>trial</sup>  
and distinctions between degrees of brutality,  
enforced in <sup>as</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>standard</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>trial</sup>  
coercion or <sup>as</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>standard</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>trial</sup>  
confessors, become irrelevant.

to constitutional validity of and availability as of every two years since

"subject to final and final decision of the Supreme" <sup>highest</sup> <sup>legislature</sup>

v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, dissenting opinion p. 157, we  
do know that it will be an effective sanction for the people against  
whom its violation is visited. We, therefore, have "no reluctance  
in condemning as unconstitutional a method of law enforcement so  
reckless and so fraught with danger and discredit to the law  
enforcement agencies themselves," Mr. Justice Jackson in McDonald  
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 461 (1948), and in rendering the  
fruits of such practice unavailable against its victims in the  
enforcement of our criminal laws.

we have noted probable jurisdiction, 346 U.S. 868, we have  
presented <sup>with</sup> the recurring question of whether it is now timely to  
review that holding. It is pointed out that in Irvine v. California,  
347 U.S. 128 (1954) this Court indicated that the states had not  
at that time had "adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the  
doctrine" of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) since  
"Never until June 1949 did this Court hold the basic search and  
seizure prohibition in any way applicable to the states under the  
Fourteenth Amendment." At p. 134. In addition, it is said, that  
in the past twelve years the basic reasoning of Wolf has been  
undercut by changed conditions as well as the subsequent development  
of the case law as to search and seizure, not only in relation to the  
exceptions previously recognized in the field but also in its  
application in the administration of justice in our dual federalism.  
That is and enough that is  
persuasive to warrant inquiry <sup>into the</sup> <sub>into the</sub>  
We find much plausible ground in this contention. "The contrariety need for a  
<sub>These</sub> "advocate no  
... standards  
of what is  
deemed reason-  
able and  
right" At p. 27  
of views of the states" which Wolf found "particularly impressive"  
is now less so. Recommed as recently as last June, the  
has reversed itself; "the remedies of private action and such  
State continuing to admit unconstitutional seized evidence, which  
had numbered 31 when Wolf was decided, numbered 24.  
Whereas 16 states then agreed with the Weeks rule, as of last  
year their number was 26. <sup>H</sup>  
Elders v. United States, 364 U.S. at p. 225

S&S Cases Since Wolf

- Wolf	338	25
Lustig	338	74 ✓ cont'd
Rabinowitz	339	56
Jeffers	342	48 vv Standing
Rochin	342	165
On Lee	343	747
Shelton	346	270
Salsburg	346	545
Walden	347	62 - credit -
Irvine	347	128
Lewis	348	419 vv
* Rea	350	214 ✓
Breithaupt	352	432
Kremen	353	346
Miller	357	301
Giordenello	357	480
- Jones	357	493
Draper	358	307
Frank	359	360
Henry	361	98
Abel	362	217
Jones	362	257 vv
Elkins	364	206 ✓
Rios	364	253 ✓
Wilson	365	381 ✓
Silverman	365	505
Coppolla		Reserv ✓

O.T. 48

Wolf v. Colorado 338/25 6/27/49 FF

Rustig v. US 338/74 6/27/49 FF

US by state in which fed participated ≠ adm  
in fed ct

not nec to consider result of US by state only

US v. Rabinowitz 339/58 SM 2/20/50

Showing SW whenever practicable ≠ sine  
qua non of "reasonableness" Trupiano  
334/699 overruled Black dissents

saying merely rule of evid & not const problem

FF dissents re such incident to arrest

Sternacci v. Minard 342/

US v. Jeffers 342/48 TCC 11/13/51

Standing to challenge SS marks in  
friend's hotel room. Had property  
int for excl rule purpose even if not  
for return.

On Lee v. US 343/747 Jackson 6/2/52

radio transmitter laundry shop ≠ SS  
viol IV FF WOD Burton = viol IV

overrule Olmstead

Shelton v. U.S 346/270 6/15/53 per cur

SG conv error CA aff'd denial 4/16  
MS - illegal + sh return all but stolen.

Salsburg v Maryland 346/545 H Burton 6/11/54

Md statute allowing use of illegal evid  
in certain moods in one County + not elsewhere or  
for similar moods + viol EPL

"Rules of evidence being procedural in their  
nature are peculiarly discretionary". Can't say  
stat = affirmatiu sanction of VLS of law at 28

Gambling offenses - cf Chicago Racket Comt. data.  
= viol DP XIV



Walden v. U.S 347/62 2/1/54 FF

Can use illegal SS marks to defeat credibility  
of deft dried testimony that never had any.

Irvine v. Calif 347/128 2/8/54 Jackson (CJ, Reed, Harlan)

made key to enter home + install mike = trespass  
Affid to overrule Wolf = affid more destruction  
based on s hool'd concurrence under Roche. To  
upset Wolf before states home had only one  
opportunity to adopt or reject ~~reject~~ the  
rule in light of Wolf's holding IV thru XIV  
would be unwarranted exercise of fedl power.

TCC concurs. HCB (WOD) Defendant re  
Fox stumps. FF dissent Roche & see p 148

## Misc Quotes

- ① On recurring problem of "reasonableness"  
see Minton in Rothwarf 339 at 63

"... The Amendt does not place an unduly oppressive burden upon law en officers but merely imposes an orderly procedure under the aegis of judicial importance that is necessary to attain the beneficial purpose intended Johnson v. U.S. 333 US 10 (1948) Officers instead of obeying this mandate have too often, as shown by the numerous cases in this Court, taken matters into their own hands and invaded the security of the people against unreasonable search and seizure."

TCC in Jeffers 342 / 48 / 51

Brennan in Mills 357 at 313  
re short cuts vs. effectiveness

WOD dissent in Draper 358 at 304  
rebuts DeLoe's murder case - no bondell.  
see also Brennan in Abel 362 at 216

to effect useless to punish officer in Rockin case. WOD directly on Weeks applicability

Lewis v. US 348/419 3/14/55 SM

tax on wages. Didn't buy stamp so no standing to say buying stamp prima facie probable cause for such & hence viol IV

Rea v. US 350/214 1/16/56 WOD <sup>no 11  
for return  
contested</sup>  
wars (Star) defective, US Supress granted, govt moved to dismiss indictment. Then fed agt swore to oath before New Mex judge & now charged w/ perjury vs viol N.Y. law. A.M. sig from D.C. vs agt testifying re wars + recognize names denied aff'd [No const problem - merely disciplinary power] Reversed.

Harrow dissent (Reed Burton Minton)  
concern only of executive since procedure not in a fact as McNabb

Breithaupt v. Abram 352/432 2/25/57 TCC

blood sample intox via homicide - even if US still aden under Wolf. Not shocking like Rockin

Warren dissent (H.B.WOD) Rockin governs.

Douglas dissent (H.B) confusion case, notably like Leyna governs as well as Rockin

Kremen v. US 353/346 5/13/57 per cur.

seizure of entire contents of home & money  
200 miles = VLS Buston TCC dissent  
velocity & ? of quantity

Miles v. US 357/301 WSB 6/23/58

break down door w/o notice  
JMH conc no op TCC HB dissent.

Giordanello v US 357/F80 6/30/58 JMH  
Comm'r had no prot come <sup>under Rules arr</sup> to issue war  
cont rely on presumption of agts pers temlage  
TCC dissent (HB, CEW)

Jones v. US 357/493 6/30/58 JMB

search w/o war on grnd prot course to  
believe house contained contraband (still)  
very used in comm'r of crime. Destroyed  
Rabinowitz - no arrest prior to search here  
TCC dissent (HB) grnd enter to arrest.

Alraper v US 358/307 1/26/59 CEW

agt had probable cause to arrest & at  
str on basis of decumphon etc. upo such  
incident search valid. WOD dissent

Frank v Maryland 359/360 FF 5/4/59

not check not case where can assert  
IV right - no crim evid sought - no self  
protection Historical roots for such imp  
w/o warn for self welfare CleWoo fumes sm  
WOD dissent (CJ, HCB, WB)

shadow on IV in civil cases. and anyway  
this could lead to misl construction of fail to  
warn

Henry v US 361/98 WOD 11/23/59

prob cause to arrest = reasonable = same as  
IV covering both <sup>any</sup> ~~such~~ - radios in car  
HCB concurs TCC + CJ dissent  
Stoppi car fastest (even tho govt conceded)

Abel v US 362/217 FF 3/28/60

adm warn

Jones v. US 362/257 FF 3/28/60

attchd - standing + probable cause  
WOD diss on prob cause.

JONES v. U.S.

362 / 257 3/28/60 (FF)

261 The restrictions upon searches and seizures were obviously designed for protection against official invasion of privacy and the security of property. They are not exclusionary provisions against the admission of kinds of evidence deemed inherently unreliable or prejudicial. The exclusion in federal trials of evidence otherwise competent but gathered by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment is a means for making effective the protection of privacy.

264 Objectionation in Rule re discretion of TJ to allow MS @ trial

"proves" that we are dealing with carrying out an important social policy and not a narrow, finicky procedural requirement

266 As to who has standing -

We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures such distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in solving the body of private property law . . . [Such distinctions] ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately

refusable to constitutional safeguards"

267

Rule now -

"anyone legitimately or reasonably where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.

Elkins v US 364/206 PS 6/27/60

overrules Rustig Silver platter doctrine  
state VLS w/o fed agt + adm in fed ct.  
FF ICC JMH CEW client

Pico v US 364 US 253 PS

Wilson v Schmetterer

Z

[Reasons in Wolf.]

For That Result

- ① 4<sup>th</sup> is enforceable vs. states.
- ② { 31 states rejected weeks  
16 accepted weeks.

392

"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and federal affairs, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints ... and the duty of giving to [the] the Fourth Amendment protection] force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizure and enforced confessions ... shows full no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.

393

of [evidence]... can thus be seized and held and used... the protection of the FA... is of no value, and, so far as those plaud are concerned, might as well be struck from the Const.

394

To sanction such procedure would be to affirm by judicial decree a manifest neglect if not open defiance of the prohibition of the C

398

"... there was involved in the order refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused ..."

ms

Gould - IV + V viol (lfss)

Dunstall II requires suppression.

Syras no rule = plain disregard of IV  
Silverman = const IV (ways no IV rigid)

Were they mostly papers in II cases?

Autonomy no problem  
Welf

Palko 302 319

Adamson 332 46

27

"basic rights do not become petrified as of  
any one time... It is of the very nature  
of a free society to advance by its  
standards of what is deemed reasonable  
and right"

"we must renounce to treat this remedy  
as an essential ingredient of the right."

Brondeis - diss. Olmstead 277 - 488

472 Regulation which "a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 387

473 Rights declared in words might be lost in reality Lucens v US 217 US 349 373  
McKenna, J

Without the enjoyment of this right, all other would lose half their value  
Illinois Commerce Comm v. Bromson

154 US 447, 479

In re Pacific Railway Commission,  
32 Fed 2d 1, 250

~~H. Gordon Shaffer~~

WO 7-2162

To Progress to

In our continuing progress toward  
solution of a society founded upon  
order and equality

that benefits the conduct of federal  
law enforcement may continue to be  
subject to redefinition more

The Court noted the fatuity of subjecting to  
statistically established <sup>the</sup> magnitude, i.e. that  
~~the~~ <sup>private</sup> ~~public~~ <sup>rights</sup> in States suffer from unconsti-  
tutional invasion of their privacy ~~in~~  
~~as~~ <sup>more</sup> in non-exclusory states.  
This do ~~not~~ & has been observed  
however that even in the former, and  
therefore quite assuredly in the latter,  
the Fourth Amendment is sacrificed on the  
altar of harassment of petty criminals,  
recidivists of minor offenses.

2522

