

a warning to the accused that he may remain silent, that anything that he says may be used against him and that he is entitled to "counsel with his lawyer." Escobedo v. Illinois,  
378 U.S. 478,

It is with regret that I find it necessary to write in these cases. However, I find myself unable to join the majority because the opinion goes too far in too little while my dissenting brethren do not for me go quite far enough.

The issue diviting the majority ~~says~~ has no support in our  
Indeed, the court says that admits that "we might not find the defendant's  
cases. ~~I find no case that decision that even gives it a prima  
statements [here] those leave involuntary in traditional terms."~~ In short, ~~the court~~  
~~and saying that reject even portions of it~~ ~~comes to~~

has added to the requirements of ~~Brumby v. Commonwealth, 299 U.S. 98 (1931)~~, a constitutional rule that no custodial interrogation may be engaged in by the police without ~~first warning~~<sup>first advising,</sup> ~~or first stating,~~<sup>mentioning,</sup> in addition to the traditional warnings, to the accused that he has a right to the presence of counsel during interrogation and that, if he is without funds, that counsel will be furnished him. ~~Contrary to the~~ With due deference to my brothers, I find no requirement in any criminal jurisprudence in the world.\* Such a strict constitutional requirement inserted at the nerve centre of crime detection may well kill the patient. Since, ~~as~~ admittedly, there is a paucity of information and a total lack of empirical knowledge on the ~~question~~ practical question of such a requirement I would be more restrained. Let me go too far too fast.

The fact that custodial interrogation ~~is~~ is recognized as "undoubtedly an essential tool to effective law enforcement" *Groves v California*, 357 U.S. 440 ( ) <sup>in *Haynes v Washington*</sup> <sup>warning us to require more</sup> ~~the most~~ guard against the promulgation of doctrinaire rules. Especially is this true where ~~it is written~~ ~~into the Const~~ the Court finds that "the Constitution has prescribed" its holding. Furthermore, since the light of our past cases from *Hopt v Utah* 110 U.S. 574 ( ) down to *Haynes v Washington* 373 U.S. 503 ( ) are to the contrary, indeed, the celebrated <sup>we should move slowly.</sup>

nowg the burden of proof to waiver  
being on the state;

(2)

Socibelo case, 378 U.S. 478, (1964) never hinted that an affirmative "waiver" <sup>was a prerequisite</sup> to questioning; nowg the presence of counsel - absent a waiver - during interrogation; nowg the furnishing of counsel to those unable to pay; nowg admissions and exculpatory statements being "confessions"; nowg that a waiver can be withdrawn at the will of the accused. To require all those things at one gulp might cause the Court to choke over more cases than Crooker, *supra*, and Akimia v. Legacy, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) which it expressly overrules today.

The rule prior to today, as the author of Socibelo (~~the author, Socibelo, supra~~) stated it in Haynes v. Washington depended upon "a totality of the circumstances evidencing an involuntary... admission of guilt" at 574. And he concluded

"detection and solving crime is, at best, a difficult and arduous task requiring determination and persistence on the part of all responsible officers charged with the duty of law enforcement. And, certainly, it does not mean to suggest that all interrogation of witnesses and suspects is impermissible... .

The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods of using police power is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is necessary to make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducement on the mind and will of an accused... .

We are here impelled to the conclusion, from all of the facts presented, that the "bendy line"

process has been exceeded" at 515.

III

I would continue to follow that rule. In the "totality  
of the circumstances" [rule] in which my brother Goldberg spoke in  
Haynes in 1963, I would take into consideration whether,  
in a given case, the police officer [prior to custodial interrogation]  
added the warning that the  
suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation and, further,  
if he was too poor to employ counsel that the court competent  
jurisdiction would appoint one at his request. In the event these  
warnings were not given the [consider that along "with all the  
~~facts presented~~ in making my appraisal of the voluntariness of the  
~~confession~~].

better would  
be on the  
state to prove  
that counsel  
was warned  
or that on  
the totality  
of the cir-  
cumstances,  
including the  
failure to give  
the warnings,  
the confession  
was voluntary.

Rather than employing the arbitrary rule which the Court  
lays down I would follow the traditional, more pliable one that  
we are accustomed to administer and which we know [from across] is an effective  
instrument in the administration of the Due Process Clause of the 14<sup>th</sup>  
Amendment. In this way we would not be acting in the dark  
nor in one full sweep changing the traditional rule of custodial  
interrogation which the Court has for so long recognized as "un-  
doubtedly an essential tool in effective law enforcement." It will  
be soon enough to go further when we are able to appraise with  
somewhat better accuracy the effect of such a holding. I therefore  
dissent.

for

\* The Court points to England, Scotland and India as having equally protective rules, as my brother Harlan points out in his dissent, infra p. 19-20, the Court is mistaken in this regard. Moreover, the requirements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Attorney General's letter do not appear to be so strict in at least two respects: (1) the offering counsel was the ~~work consult with~~, apparently taken from Sacred. The presence of counsel at the custodial interrogation is not mentioned in the warning. Nor does the FBI warning include ~~anyone that suspect does~~ is put in the [ ] "a right to counsel"; nothing is said about a right to <sup>present</sup> ~~have~~ counsel at the custodial interrogation. (2) ~~The offering counsel to those unable to pay, merely advises that such counsel will be assigned by the Judge.~~ Indeed, the practice is that whenever the accused "decides that he wishes to counsel before making a statement, the interview is terminated at that point... When counsel appears in person, he is permitted to confer with his client in private." This clearly indicates that counsel is not present at the interview. (3) ~~as to the offering of those not able to pay for counsel~~ (2) The same practice is followed as to indigents, except in addition the Agent advises "those who have been arrested for an offense under the FBI jurisdiction, or whose arrest is contemplated following the interview, of a right to free counsel if they are unable to pay, and the availability of such counsel from the Judge." The right will be interpreted by the type of suspect which the Court continually mentions as meaning that he could get counsel when tried ~~not~~ by the Judge not at custodial interrogation.

~~they are mostly law review articles and  
books written by professors without practical  
experience.~~

NOR CAN I JOIN IN THE <sup>Court's</sup> ~~CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION~~ CRITICISM OF THE <sup>Police AND INVESTIGATORY Agencies</sup> present practice as to custodial interrogation. THE BOOKS and articles THAT it refers to as "police manuals" are not shown by the papers in the record here to be the official manuals of any police department or being in universal use in crime detection. ~~On the contrary I ~~do~~ say now~~ <sup>moreover</sup> ~~of them enjoy such recognition.~~ THE EXAMPLES of police brutality mentioned by ~~by the Court~~ <sup>the Court</sup> are but a ~~few~~ <sup>exception</sup> are the rare exception to the thousands of cases that ~~appear in~~ <sup>State</sup> appear in the law reports every year. I am proud of our police agencies all the way from "New York's Finest" to the "Pride of ~~Fairfax~~ Berkeley" and the federal bureaus as well.

X Kidd, Police Interrogation (1940); Mulkerin, Interrogation (1951); Dienstein, ~~Techniques~~ Techniques for the Crime Detective (1952); La Fave, ~~Arrest~~ ETC

1962 WASH. U. L. Q. ~~331~~; Barnett, Police Practices and the Law - 50 Calif Law Rev 11 (1962); Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. Pub. L. 25 (1965); Inbau and Reid, Criminal Detention and Interrogation, (1962); O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation (1959)